Source:www.irrawaddy.org
By MOE ZAW OO
In her first public speech in 1988 at the foot of Shwedagon Pagoda, Aung San Suu Kyi addressed the pro-democracy movement, saying: “This national crisis, in fact, should be called the Second Struggle for Independence.”
Twenty-two years later, another second struggle is at hand—with calls for a second Panglong
Conference coming from a Zomi National Congress meeting in Kalay Township in Sagaing Division on Sunday.
The so-called “Kalay Declaration” has roused the movement again.
The idea for a Second Panglong Conference was expressed by Suu Kyi on Feb. 11, 1989, as she toured the small but historic city of Panglong in Shan State, the place where her father Aung San met with ethnic leaders in February 1947 and signed an accord known from that day forward as the “Panglong Agreement.”
Standing in the shadow of Burma's most famous landmark, the diminutive Suu Kyi reiterated the National League for Democracy's (NLD's) Declaration No. 9, which stated that “a national consultative convention similar to the Panglong Conference, which had instituted future guiding principles for the Union, will be convened.”
The Kalay Declaration reaffirms the importance of Panglong-like conferences “to build up the country inhabited by different ethnic nationalities with a genuine federal system based on democracy and human rights, which is neither a unitary system nor a system for secession.”
It also points out the importance of a dialogue, and the importance of Suu Kyi's leadership, clearly holding her up as the only potential architect for a “Second Panglong.”
A dialogue in terms of successive resolutions of the United Nations refers to a tripartite dialogue in which three parties—the pro-democracy camp, the ethnic nationalities and the military—must be included.
The tripartite dialogue, on the other hand, highlights the fact that the country is struggling not only with democratic change, but also with regards to ethnic minorities. In other words, it is embroiled in a constitutional crisis.
After Aung San and leaders of the Shan, Chin and Kachin groups signed the Panglong Agreement on Feb. 12, 1947, a constitution was drawn up. It was a national tragedy that Aung San was assassinated shortly afterward, on July 19 that same year, and never lived to see the fruit of his labor—Burmese independence.
Ever since then, constitutional crisis has reigned in Burma. Ethnic nationalities rightly point out that the Constitution failed to implement their rights, and was used as an excuse by the military to seize power from civilian rule.
This time around—Burma's Second Struggle for Independence—it appears clear that the ethnic problem is no less important than the achievement of democracy in Burma. Both are more intertwined than ever, unlike during the transition from British colonial rule when the yearning for independence trumped any notions of federalism.
Suu Kyi took a further step to reconcile with the ethnic groups when her party announced the “Bo Aung Kyaw Street Declaration” in 1990—a call for a federal union that had been signed by the NLD and the United Nationalities League for Democracy, which consisted of 21 ethnic political parties that had won seats in the 1990 general election.
Similar to the NLD Declaration No. 9, the 1990 declaration stated: “All ethnic nationalities shall have racial and political equality, fully enjoy the right to self-determination, and build through the strength of unity a Union that guarantees democracy and basic human rights.”
Regarding the right to self-determination, the Panglong Agreement also states in its Section (5): “ … deprivation of any portion of the autonomy which the Frontier Areas now enjoy in internal administration will not be accepted. Full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle.”
The Constitution approved in 2008 through a sham referendum, however, does not guarantee any right to self-determination or self-administrative power to the ethnic nationalities. In May 2004, just before the National Convention resumed, six cease-fire groups—including the Kachin Independence Organization, the New Mon State Party and the Shan State Army—delivered a letter to the National Convention Convening Commission calling for review of the principles already set and the participation of people’s representatives elected in the 1990 polls.
By the end of the National Convention, several of the major cease-fire groups had given up any aspirations of self-determination. They consequently refused to recognize the Constitution, to participate in the elections or to lay down their arms. They also dismissed the junta's Border Guard Force proposal.
As things stand now, the ethnic groups have played their cards and are awaiting the regime's response.
By MOE ZAW OO
In her first public speech in 1988 at the foot of Shwedagon Pagoda, Aung San Suu Kyi addressed the pro-democracy movement, saying: “This national crisis, in fact, should be called the Second Struggle for Independence.”
Twenty-two years later, another second struggle is at hand—with calls for a second Panglong
Conference coming from a Zomi National Congress meeting in Kalay Township in Sagaing Division on Sunday.
The so-called “Kalay Declaration” has roused the movement again.
The idea for a Second Panglong Conference was expressed by Suu Kyi on Feb. 11, 1989, as she toured the small but historic city of Panglong in Shan State, the place where her father Aung San met with ethnic leaders in February 1947 and signed an accord known from that day forward as the “Panglong Agreement.”
Standing in the shadow of Burma's most famous landmark, the diminutive Suu Kyi reiterated the National League for Democracy's (NLD's) Declaration No. 9, which stated that “a national consultative convention similar to the Panglong Conference, which had instituted future guiding principles for the Union, will be convened.”
The Kalay Declaration reaffirms the importance of Panglong-like conferences “to build up the country inhabited by different ethnic nationalities with a genuine federal system based on democracy and human rights, which is neither a unitary system nor a system for secession.”
It also points out the importance of a dialogue, and the importance of Suu Kyi's leadership, clearly holding her up as the only potential architect for a “Second Panglong.”
A dialogue in terms of successive resolutions of the United Nations refers to a tripartite dialogue in which three parties—the pro-democracy camp, the ethnic nationalities and the military—must be included.
The tripartite dialogue, on the other hand, highlights the fact that the country is struggling not only with democratic change, but also with regards to ethnic minorities. In other words, it is embroiled in a constitutional crisis.
After Aung San and leaders of the Shan, Chin and Kachin groups signed the Panglong Agreement on Feb. 12, 1947, a constitution was drawn up. It was a national tragedy that Aung San was assassinated shortly afterward, on July 19 that same year, and never lived to see the fruit of his labor—Burmese independence.
Ever since then, constitutional crisis has reigned in Burma. Ethnic nationalities rightly point out that the Constitution failed to implement their rights, and was used as an excuse by the military to seize power from civilian rule.
This time around—Burma's Second Struggle for Independence—it appears clear that the ethnic problem is no less important than the achievement of democracy in Burma. Both are more intertwined than ever, unlike during the transition from British colonial rule when the yearning for independence trumped any notions of federalism.
Suu Kyi took a further step to reconcile with the ethnic groups when her party announced the “Bo Aung Kyaw Street Declaration” in 1990—a call for a federal union that had been signed by the NLD and the United Nationalities League for Democracy, which consisted of 21 ethnic political parties that had won seats in the 1990 general election.
Similar to the NLD Declaration No. 9, the 1990 declaration stated: “All ethnic nationalities shall have racial and political equality, fully enjoy the right to self-determination, and build through the strength of unity a Union that guarantees democracy and basic human rights.”
Regarding the right to self-determination, the Panglong Agreement also states in its Section (5): “ … deprivation of any portion of the autonomy which the Frontier Areas now enjoy in internal administration will not be accepted. Full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle.”
The Constitution approved in 2008 through a sham referendum, however, does not guarantee any right to self-determination or self-administrative power to the ethnic nationalities. In May 2004, just before the National Convention resumed, six cease-fire groups—including the Kachin Independence Organization, the New Mon State Party and the Shan State Army—delivered a letter to the National Convention Convening Commission calling for review of the principles already set and the participation of people’s representatives elected in the 1990 polls.
By the end of the National Convention, several of the major cease-fire groups had given up any aspirations of self-determination. They consequently refused to recognize the Constitution, to participate in the elections or to lay down their arms. They also dismissed the junta's Border Guard Force proposal.
As things stand now, the ethnic groups have played their cards and are awaiting the regime's response.
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